CONCEPT OF LAUGHTER IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAGMATISM

В. Ю. Жарких

Abstract


The paradox in the title can be explained by the seeming in compatability of laughter and philosophy, since there appears to be little in common between fundamental problems of philosophy and a fleeting, emotional and situational outburst of laughter.

This paradox becomes less unexpected if viewed through the context of interrelation between philosophy and linguistics as was suggested by early pragmatists. Their postulates were developed in the theory of the so called «linguistic turn», within which this interrelation became the most important methodological concept. It postulated that thought is objectivizedin the process of social usage of language. Its rules are regulated by the consensus of the language community as to what is right / wrong concerning language rules / norms and validity of truth criteria of judgments and statements.

No less significant is the cognitive value of the seme and the frequency of its usage. The more the seme is needed, the more plastic it becomes within the semantic triangle where it functions. Since there is no absolute coincidence in similar life situations, verbal symbols expressing ideas, things, phenomena, often tend to be used in a transferred sense to better express the unique character of a given reality.

Cognitive change and mobility in the semantic structure of the word laughter is a good example of this tendency. In Rodale thesaurus itsseme is realized in 29 verbal symbols. The seme of humor, correlated with it, is expressed in 183 verbal units. If to add to them cognitively kindred semes – fun, joviality, gaiety, hilarity, mirth – together with their synonyms and derivatives – the number of verbal units will grow immensely. This wide choice of ways to express a notion shows its cognitive importance. Laughter as a purely human feature is indispensible for understanding human life and thus acquires a deep philosophical significance.   

Classical pragmatists, W. James, J. Dewey, F. C. S. Schiller, to name only a few, considered laughter as a handy and useful tool by means of which man can determine the difference between good and bad. He can do it by referring to the wealth of his native language and by using it to understand and make himself understood.


Keywords


сміх; гумор; семантика вербальних одиниць; культура соціальних відносин

References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.32620/gch.2018.2.04

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